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Knowledge is a collective good. Only a small
part of our knowledge of the world is 
generated by our own personal experience.
Relying on what others say is one of the most
fundamental ways to acquire knowledge, not
only about the external world, but also about
who we are, for instance about when and
where we were born. To use Mary Douglas’
words: “Our colonisation of each others’ minds
is the price we pay for thought”.1
Traditionally, epistemology had banned from
genuine knowledge beliefs acquired by trusting
others. Knowledge or rational belief, as
opposed to opinion, should ultimately be based
on individually held clear and distinct ideas
(Descartes) or sense impressions (Locke) 
together with sound relations among these
ideas. An individualistic stance has persisted in
the contemporary debate, claiming that 
individually held reasons and individual 
cognitive states are the only ground of 
justiﬁcation of our beliefs.
Nevertheless a number of social phenomena
such as the role of expertise in public decisions
within democratic societies, collaborative work
in “Big Science” and in the Academe, or the
informational explosion due to new media and
technologies have forced at least a part of 
contemporary epistemology to incorporate 
sociological notions such as trust, deference
and authority. A division of cognitive labour is
now recognized as a property of every cultural
system, science included.2
Although there is widespread agreement that
our epistemic dependence on other people’s
knowledge is a key ingredient of our cognitive
life, the role of trust in this dependence is much
more open to debate. Is trust in epistemic 
authority—or “epistemic trust” for short—an 
epistemological notion in any sense, or is it 
simply a bridge-concept that connects our 
epistemological concerns to moral issues?
Should we depict it in terms of the more familiar
sociological notion of trust as a basis for 
cooperation? If epistemic trust and moral or
social trust are different things, are they related,
and how? It is obvious enough that people’s
trust in the “cognitive order” of their society—
what rules and principles govern the distribution
of knowledge in society, who are the experts,
why they should be believed—inﬂuences their
trust in its social order and it is inﬂuenced by it.3
Good illustration of this was provided by recent
events involving governments’ invocation of
Intelligence expert’s dossiers on the alleged 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq to justify war, and the backlash of public
opinion when this expertise proved unreliable
and its political exploitation disingenuous. Still,
while the existence of strong relations between
moral/social and epistemic/cognitive notions
of trust is not in doubt, their character has not
been clearly elucidated.
To contribute to such an elucidation, I will
review different approaches to epistemic 
authority, some that come from outside of 
philosophical epistemology, and others 
developed within epistemology itself. In looking
at epistemological approaches, I will pay 
particular attention to the tension between
reductionist vs. non-reductionist approaches to
trust and testimonial knowledge. Unavoidably,
the accounts I will give and the contrasts I will
draw will be oversimpliﬁed. Still, I hope they
will sufﬁce to give plausibility to the ﬁrst main
claim of this article, namely that epistemic trust
is illuminated by all these diverse approaches
and fully accounted for by none of them,
because it genuinely involves a variety of 
cognitive and social mechanisms that can be
normatively evaluated from several points of
view. I will then present what I believe is a 
neglected and poorly understood form of 
epistemic trust involved in the pragmatics of 
G L O R I A O R I G G I
IS TRUST AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL NOTION?
E P I S T E M E J u n e  2 0 0 4 1
sharpen the notions of epistemic trust and
authority and may have indeed contributed to
their vagueness. “Trust” is sometimes being used
with reference to the cooperation needed 
within the scientiﬁc enterprise, at other times
with reference to the testimonial source of most
of our ordinary beliefs, and at other times yet to
refer to the uncritical reliance of lay people on
experts. Are we talking of the same thing in all
three cases, or should we, to begin with,
acknowledge that there are many sub-varieties
of epistemic trust just as there are many varieties
of trust in general, casting doubt on the 
possibility of a single integrated account? If we
entertain the possibility that we may be talking,
under the name of trust, about a variety of 
related but different attitudes, and if we adopt,
at least for the time being, an aim more modest
than that of a developing a general theory of
trust, we may be better placed to take 
advantage of a variety of perspectives.
Political philosophy is a source of insight for
social epistemology. In political philosophy, trust
is seen as a key component of the authority 
relation, in which a person desists from
demanding justiﬁcation of the thing she is being
asked to do or to believe as a condition of her
doing or believing.9 Something of this kind
seems at play when the lay person blindly
defers to a recognised authority, be it an expert,
a “wise man” (or woman), or a religious leader.
We are all familiar with such cases of blind 
deference. They typically involve the 
acceptance of beliefs that are only partially
understood. I believe my doctor who tells 
me that my level of cholesterol is too high, 
and I follow her prescription, even if my 
understanding of what cholesterol is is quite
poor, and my comprehension of its 
physiological role is hopelessly metaphorical.10
Is this sort of deference ever justiﬁed in some 
relevant sense, and should epistemology pay
attention to it? I think it should. The focus in the
literature on testimony on beliefs the contents of
which are perfectly clear but for which we lack
direct evidence has contributed to giving an
unrealistic picture of our dependence on 
socially distributed knowledge. It is as if the 
paradigmatic case of social transfer of 
knowledge were that found in the community of
birdwatchers. Among birdwatchers, reports
such as: “A count of 32 Mediterranean Gulls
was made on the Isle of Wight on the 7th” are
believed without any further check, thanks to the
strong mutual respect and sense of cooperation
found in such communities.11 However, in many
social situations—including situations playing a
major role in cultural transmission—the 
information exchanged is much less 
straightforward and raises problems not 
just of believability but also of comprehension.
The interplay between believability and 
comprehension and the role of cooperation not
just in epistemic but also in interpretive guidance
are, I suggest, important aspects of epistemic
trust.
Social theory approaches to cooperation 
drawing on rational choice and on game 
theory are another source of insight for social
epistemology. Communication is a form of
cooperation. As in the case of cooperation in
general, it raises the question of what causes
communicator to cooperate when their interests
might often be better served by defecting. In
many cooperation games having the structure of
an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, it has been
shown12 that a tit for tat strategy of one party
makes defection less advantageous than 
cooperation for the other party (with 
generalisation to the many players case). In an
article entitled “Epistemological Tit of Tat,”
Michel Blais has argued that such a game-
theoretic approach might be extended to trust
within a scientiﬁc community.13 Scientists have
an interest in reporting genuine observations
and results, because the costs of uncooperative
behaviour (i.e. cheating) is high, and typically
consists in the public and permanent exclusion
of the cheater from the community. This view has
been criticised for placing excessive conﬁdence
in the reliability of the constraints.14 Another 
possible line of criticism is to question the 
adequateness of the iterated game of Prisoner’s
Dilemma to the case of science. Something like
a tit for tat strategy may be at work in the 
decision of scientiﬁc teams working on the same
issues to share or not to share results before 
publication: you don’t share with me, I don’t
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verbal comprehension.  This pragmatic form of
epistemic trust calls, I will argue, for a non-
reductionist account. Therefore—and this will 
be my second main claim—in no domain 
where social knowledge relies on verbal 
communication can epistemic trust be fully
accounted for in a reductionist way. 
Non-epistemological approaches
Epistemic authority and trust are not just 
philosophical topics, they are important aspects
of human social life. As such, they can, and
indeed should, be studied as social-historical
phenomena.  To give just one example, in his
inﬂuential book, A Social History of Truth,
Steven Shapin (1994) reconstructs the role of
gentlemanly culture in determining credibility in
the scientiﬁc practices of early modern science,
in particular in the constitution of the British
Royal Academy and its new experimental 
standards for scientiﬁc discourse. Trust and 
civility are inseparable concepts: they deﬁne a
cultural system, that is, a set of presuppositions
that guides “conversation” not just in its ordinary
sense but also in the Latin sense of conversatio,
that is, the art of conducting oneself in social
interactions. In this cultural system, an 
honourable gentleman is precisely one who
deserves to be trusted. Social practices of
recognition, cultural heuristics and epistemic
maxims are intertwined in the cultural 
constitution of any body of knowledge, science
included. Shapin’s history of trust has the merit of
embedding deference to epistemic authority in
historical and practical contexts, in contrast to
more abstract and formalized approaches
found in philosophy. His approach converges in
this respect with sociological research (and in
particular sociology of science)4 and, for that
matter, sociological commonsense. In people’s
ordinary deference to the epistemic authority of
others, epistemological, moral and cultural 
reasons are completely intertwined. The 
ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel nicely
illustrated the difﬁculty of disentangling moral
and cognitive trust when he suggested the 
following informal experiment: try to 
systematically distrust a friend’s or a relative’s
everyday factual reports: she will ﬁnd it an 
intolerable attack on her person and her moral
integrity, and it will be hard to re-establish the
relationship even after having been told of your
hidden experimental agenda.5
Does the sociological or historical 
perspective show that trust or authority are just
historically situated social constructions that 
cannot be normatively evaluated outside of their
social-historical context? Does it render 
irrelevant philosophical issues regarding the
nature and rationality of trust? It is, of course
quite possible to acknowledge the fruitfulness of
the social-scientiﬁc approach without embracing
the kind of relativism that is frequently 
associated with it. 
From within philosophy itself, trust in 
epistemic authority is being approached from a
variety of perspective, and not just from a 
strictly epistemological one. After all, trust seems
to be a crucial aspect of interpersonal 
relationships, of the social and political order,
and of cooperation in general. Trust is seen as 
something that “is there” and calls for a 
deﬁnition. This is not to say that there is 
generally accepted deﬁnition of trust, far from it. 
In political philosophy, trust is standardly
seen as a voluntary transfer of power to those
who govern, a transfer that cannot be justiﬁed
simply in terms of coercion or of rational 
argument.6 In social theory, trust is frequently
treated as a form of rational choice to pursue
ongoing cooperation.7 In moral philosophy, trust
is often considered as a social virtue that cannot
be reduced to strategic thinking.8 All these 
different treatments attempt to capture the 
elusive idea of an intentional surrender of 
control on one’s own actions and decisions that
seems difﬁcult to reconcile with the autonomy of
a rational agent. To what extent are these 
various approaches to trust in general relevant
to the study of trust in epistemic authority? I have
no general answer to propose to this question,
but I will brieﬂy consider three of speciﬁc 
possible contributions, from political philosophy,
from social theory, and from moral philosophy.
Let me ﬁrst, however, express a following 
cautionary remark. An uncritical import of
approaches to moral and social trust and
authority into epistemology has failed to 
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and argued that while they all had something to 
contribute to our understanding of the notion,
none provided a comprehensive account. I now
turn to epistemological approaches.
Epistemological approaches
If I grant you epistemic authority because of
independent reasons—which may be direct of
indirect, moral or epistemic—I have to think that
you are a reliable source of information, then
I’m granting you derivative authority. Whereas,
if I suspend my reasons in granting you 
authority and I am willing to accept whatever
you say just because you believe it, then I’m
granting you fundamental authority.18 This 
distinction between derivative and fundamental
authority retraces in part the classical distinction
in the philosophy of testimony between 
reductionists and anti-reductionists. Hume is the
historical representative of the reductionist 
position: According to him, reliance on 
testimony is based on the same kind of inductive
inference that justiﬁes any other belief, that is,
on the evidence of accustomed conformity of
testimonies to facts. We rely on others because
experience has shown them to be reliable, thus
we have independent reasons to believe them.
The non-reductionist view is historically 
represented by Thomas Reid, who considered
the evidence of testimony as a fundamental 
category of evidence neither reducible to other
forms of perceptual or inferential evidence nor
justiﬁable in terms of them. As he famously
wrote: “The wise and beneﬁcent Author of
nature, who intended that we should be social
creatures, and that we should receive the 
greatest and most important part of our 
knowledge by the information of others, hath,
for these purposes implanted in our natures two
principles that tally with each other. The ﬁrst of
these principles is a propensity to speak truth...
[the second] is a disposition to conﬁde in the
veracity of others, and to believe what they tell
us”.19
Both reductionist and non-reductionist views
of trust have developed in recent epistemology. 
In his 1991 article on “The role of Trust in
Knowledge” John Hardwig warned 
epistemologists that they should acknowledge
trust as “the ultimate foundation for much of our
knowledge”.20 This didn’t imply, according to
him, a major departure from usual 
epistemological concerns. According to
Hardwig trusting others is normatively 
accountable in terms of a particular class of 
reasons that justifies the acquisition of 
knowledge through testimony: If A has reasons
to believe that B has reasons to believe that 
p, then A has reasons to believe that p, even if
the nature of A’s reasons is irreducibly different
from that of B’s. A’s reasons to believe that p are
based in her assessment of the “epistemic 
character” of B and in particular of his honesty
and competence, whereas B’s reasons to
believe that p depend on his assessment of the
evidence for or against p.21 Trust is thus a 
matter of assessing the moral and epistemic
reliability of other people on a particular subject
matter. Notice that, in this account, 
epistemology doesn’t reduce to ethics, nor the
other way around. Rather, what is claimed is
that epistemology should integrate some moral
standards. Trust itself reduces to a mix of 
epistemic and moral reasons.
Other contemporary epistemologists, Alvin
Goldman and Philip Kitcher in particular,22
develop a reductionist account of trust in which
considerations of social factors contribute to 
reasons and justiﬁcations for holding beliefs.
They integrate the kind of reasoning that justiﬁes
our trust in vicarious knowledge in an overall
view of cognition that may be described as
rationalist. In this perspective, trusting others
means having reliable criteria to assess their
competence and trustworthiness. Fine 
distinctions can be made among these criteria.
People may have different reasons to allocate
authority to others, all equally rational. A person
may allocate contextual authority to people she
judges happen to be in a better epistemic 
position to provide some speciﬁc information. In
such a case, trusting others is a way of 
exploiting their perception and reasoning as
proxy for one’s own. We use experts as
“tools”23, as we use a telescope to enhance our
perception. Understanding a social process of
development and distribution of knowledge may
give me indirect criteria for trusting speciﬁc
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share with you. But this form of cooperation is of
limited epistemic relevance. In the more 
epistemically signiﬁcant case of the publication
of observations and results, the response to the
production of fake evidence is not symmetrical.
It is not to produce false results in return until
defectors fall back in line, it is to ostracize them.
This response is not only qualitatively but also
quantitatively asymmetrical, and costly not just
to the defector, but also to the community at
large. Why deprive the community forever from
the input of competent scientists that have, 
typically, been carried away by their theoretical
convictions, rather than punish them in 
proportion to the damage done and then 
reintegrate them? Would not this be costly
enough to the perpetrators to deter scientists
tempted to fake their data? Ostracism of 
evidence-fakers seems guided, at least in part,
by a sense of moral disgust among scientists
who are eager to preserve their collective 
self-esteem and not just the epistemic value of
their output.
While a game theoretical approach may 
provide partial insight in accounting for trust in
scientific practice, its relevance to the 
understanding of trust in everyday face-to-face
communication is dubious.  In particular, a tit for
tat strategy makes sense if basically the same
game with similar pay-offs is played again and
again and if, in this game, defection is 
advantageous unless it is sanctioned. In 
personal relationships, however, the goals of
communication are extremely varied. Most of
these goals—coordination of action for
instance—are better achieved through 
competent and honest communication. Given
this, there is no systematic and obvious way of 
sanctioning someone who has, on a particular
occasion, pursued his advantage by means of
dishonest communication. Typical reactions are
more of a moral than of a strategic character.15
Trust seems to be allocated in a manner that is
too context-sensitive and too morally and psy-
chologically rich to be well captured by game-
theoretical modelling.
Moral philosophy is a third source of insight
on trust. It may appeal to the intuition that “trust
is not the fact that one, after calculating the
odds, feels no risk: It is feeling no risk without
calculating the odds”.16 In moral philosophy,
trust is often analysed as a particular prior 
commitment to a relationship and not an 
outcome of the cooperative behaviour between
the parties. This prior commitment is not 
obviously purposive. I do not trust others in order
to gain from my interaction. Rather, the fact that
I trust them gives me an expectation to gain from
interacting with them in some occasions.
According to Annette Bayer, trust and distrust
are feeling responses, not cognitive states, to
how we take our situation to be: an accepted
vulnerability to another’s possible, but not
expected, ill will. To what extent is such a view
of trust of interest to epistemology? Does it help
capture the fundamental role of trust in the 
acquisition of vicarious knowledge? Epistemic
trust is trust, on the one hand, in the goodwill of
others, and, on the other hand, in their 
competence. The moral notion of trust is of clear
relevance to assessing goodwill, in particular in
enduring personal relationships, but it seems of
no relevance to the assessment of competence.
Trusting the other party’s willingness to take into
account my own interest, either for the sake of
our future relation, or simply out of an affective
attitude, doesn’t assure me that what I am
obtaining is valuable information. The moral 
attitude of trust may yet inﬂuence the sharing of
information in other ways. On the one hand it
may cause interlocutors to do their epistemic
best. On the other hand, it may cause the 
morally trusting receiver of information to display
a stance of epistemic trust for the sake of the
relationship.  She may then either lower her
epistemic criteria for accepting a belief (my
friend says he is too tired to go to the cinema, I
would not have thought so, but I will believe
him), or remain inwardly sceptical and possibly
check what she has been told on the basis of
independent evidence.17 Even in strong 
enduring personal relationships epistemic trust
does not reduce to moral trust. Moreover, the
less personal and enduring the relationship, the
more limited is the relevance of the moral notion
of trust to the epistemic notion. 
In this section, I have brieﬂy examined 
arious non-epistemological approaches to trust,
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to look when looking for fundamental 
deference.
If trusting others is as fundamental a channel
through which we acquire information as are
perception or memory, this should be reﬂected
in the functioning of linguistic communication
(just as it is in the mechanisms of perception and
memory). Take the role of deference in 
semantics analysed by Hilary Putnam and Tyler
Burge.  In his famous 1975 article, “The
Meaning of Meaning”, Putnam pointed out that
the use of language is intrinsically deferential: I
do not need to be an expert chemist to use the
word “aluminium”—even if I am not able to 
distinguish aluminium from steel—because the
“distribution of linguistic labour” as Putnam calls
it, links my use of this term to the relevant 
knowledge possessed by the metal experts in
my linguistic community. Deference to “expert” is
particularly manifest in language acquisition. A
child may hear the word “bat” and start using it
with little or no understanding of what bats are
while still intending to refer to what adults
around her would refer to in using the term and
tacitly deferring to their authority.
Deference regarding meaning and reference
should be distinguished from a more truly 
epistemic attitude of acceptance of statements.
Still, viewing linguistic practices as intrinsically
deferential at a semantic level goes well with
seeing them as deferential at an epistemic level.
It is no surprise, therefore, to see Tylor Burge
argue that relying on interlocution is so 
fundamental that we are entitled to “accept as
true something that is presented as true and that
is intelligible [to us] unless there are stronger 
reasons not to do so” (what he calls the
Acceptance Principle). Note that we do not use
this principle as a justiﬁcation according to
Burge: we’re simply “entitled to acquire 
information according to the principle”.27
In his book Testimony, Anthony Coady
exploits the Davidsonian Principle of Charity to
derive an a priori justiﬁcation of testimony.
Language interpretation requires a massive attri-
bution of truths to our interlocutors. Speaking the
truth and sharing public meanings are so 
closely intertwined that the very existence of a
public language would be impossible without a
strong positive correlation between the 
sentences uttered in that language and the facts
they represent. Even reductionist approaches to
testimony presuppose the existence of a public
language, and therefore of at least some a 
priori positive correlation between testimonies
and their truth, since without such a correlation,
there would be no language in the ﬁrst place.
Burge and Coady base an a priori 
justiﬁcation of trust in testimony on fundamental
properties of language use, although different
ones. For Burge it is what he sees as the purely
preservative character of successful linguistic
communication that entitles us to rely on what
we understand other to be saying. Just as 
memory, he argues, understanding an utterance
preserves without any addition or transformation
the content of the thought communicated, and
this is what makes it unproblematically 
acceptable. For Coady the relevant property is
that the very possibility of a common language
and therefore of mutual understanding presup-
poses a generally truthful use of speech.  Burge’s
idea that comprehension is preservative has
been questioned by Anne Bezuidenhout.28 It
totally ignores empirical accounts of the process
of comprehension: making sense of what other
people say is an inferential interpretive process
and not a mere decoding one. I will return to
this point in the ﬁnal section. Here I cannot 
discuss in detail Coady’s insightful position. Let
me just mention one possible objection. What is
needed for the stabilisation of shared meanings,
in his Davidsonian perspective, is a mass of true
and trivial statements, as is indeed found in 
ordinary communication. However, what an
individual is told, and in particular the non-trivial
statements she particularly cares about, is not a
random sample of all statements. How then
should the fact that, on average, most 
statements are true (and trivial) justify an 
individual’s acceptance on trust and without
examination of what she is told by speciﬁc 
interlocutors on speciﬁc topics?
A ﬁne-grained analysis of what is at stake in
the exchange of information seems needed for
a better understanding of trust in knowledge
acquisition. Many of the tensions that shape the
debate on trust in epistemology might be 
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sources. I may have a good understanding of
the process of assessing and filtering 
information in peer reviewed journals and 
evidence about the quality of this process in 
different journal. This provides me reasons to put
greater or lesser trust in the article published in
these journals. Or I can be acquainted with your
track records on a particular issue and judge
that you have earned authority or, better, 
reputation on this issue.24 The analysis of such
ﬁne-grained criteria for the allocation of trust
contributes to a better epistemological 
description and evaluation of various systems of
distribution of knowledge (and also to the
design of such systems)
It would be hard to dispute (except from a
radical sceptic point of view) that we often have
reasons to trust others on speciﬁc subject matters
and that many of our beliefs are acquired
through such reasoned trust, and justiﬁably so.
But are vicarious beliefs generally based on
such reasoned trust? And when they are not,
can they nevertheless be justiﬁed?  It is quite
debatable whether it is ever rational to accept
what another person says on the simple basis
that she says it. Trust in such fundamental 
authority is similar to the acceptance of political
authority as standardly conceived, in that it
involves a form of “surrender of judgement.”
The difference between derived and 
fundamental authority (and the associated
reductive and non-reductive notion of trust) is not
that one is justiﬁed and the other not, it is that
people who trust derived authority attend to 
reasons to do so in each case, whereas people
who trust fundamental authority do so without
attending to reasons. Proponents of the notion of
fundamental authority and of a non-reductive
account of trust, on the other hand, provide 
justiﬁcations for such authority and such trust.
Reid’s justiﬁcation appeals to the wisdom and
beneficence of the “Author of nature.” A 
standard move in contemporary epistemology
to justify trust in fundamental authority is to view
it as an extension of the necessary self-trust that
we grant to our past, present and future 
judgements. Granting no authority to ourselves
would amount to a form of hyper-scepticism
about the very possibility of holding justiﬁed
beliefs. But if we take our own past judgements
as proxy for present ones on no other grounds
than the fact that they are our judgements,
couldn’t we accept other people’s judgements
on similar grounds? Why should we be 
so “egoist,” to quote Richard Foley, in 
epistemology? 
Moreover, as Gibbard has argued, other
people’s inﬂuence has been pervasive in our
past, especially in our childhood. If we admit
that our norms of reasoning today have been
inﬂuenced by others, we cannot but accord
legitimacy to this inﬂuence and should not
exclude the legitimacy of possible inﬂuence of
this kind in the future. Thus, he argues, “we must
accord others some fundamental authority.”25
How good is the analogy between the
authority we grant our own cognitive 
mechanisms and the authority we grant others?
Both our cognitive mechanisms and other 
people can—and often do—misinform us. So
we may be justiﬁed in relying on these two
source of information if, or when, we have no
better choice, but we are not justiﬁed in 
granting them absolute authority. So far the 
analogy holds. Our own cognitive mechanisms
typically misinform us when they are 
malfunctioning, but otherwise, their function is to
inform us; they are working for our own good,
so to speak. When others misinform us, it may
be that they are themselves mistaken and 
cognitively malfunctioning, or it may be that they
are serving their interest at the expense of ours.
Here the analogy breaks down: there are 
speciﬁc reasons, having to do with possible
divergence of interests, to mistrust others, 
reasons that do not apply to oneself. On the
other hand, there is much more accumulated
knowledge and competence in our social 
surroundings than inside us. There are therefore
speciﬁc reasons to seek from others information
that could not be found in oneself, or only less
reliably. The analogy breaks down a second
time. Still, it has been maintained, for instance
by Ruth Millikan26, that communication is a
form of cognition by proxy, and that we are as
predisposed to accept communicated 
information as information from our senses. To
see whether this is indeed the case, we must
turn to the mechanisms of verbal 
communication, which should be the ﬁrst place
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trust in the relevance of the speaker in order to
understand her. When truthfulness is a condition
for relevance, as it often is, hearers adopt a
stance of trust in the speaker’s truthfulness too. To
give just one illustration, consider the following
utterance:
Watchmaker to Mary: It will take some time
to repair your watch
Literally understood, the watchmaker’s statement
is a truism since repairing a watch is a process
extended over time. If Mary was interpreting this
utterance just on the basis of a presumption of
truthfulness or of a Davidsonian principle of
charity, she might be satisﬁed with its literal 
truistic meaning. Looking for an interpretation
that fulﬁls her expectation of relevance, she
understands that repairing her watch will take
more time than she might have expected. For
instance, if she might have expected the watch
to be repaired the next day, she will understand
the watchmaker as meaning that it will take 
several days. Why not understand him to mean
that it will take an absurdly high amount of time,
years for instance, since this would be even
more relevant? It would be relevant only if true,
otherwise it would be just a poor joke. Here 
relevance implies truth. Mary takes the watch-
maker to be committing himself not to the truth of
any interpretation of “some time” in his 
utterance, but to the truth of the ﬁrst interpretation
that is relevant enough to be worth her attention.
Having understood what the watchmaker
means, she may then choose to question its
truth, but still, she had to adopt a stance of trust
in relevance, which involved a stance of trust in
truthfulness as a subpart, in order to understand
what her interlocutor meant.
This is not the place to discuss the merits of 
different pragmatic approaches such as that of
Grice and that of Sperber and Wilson.
Whatever their differences, they converge in
suggesting that a stance of trust (that may be
directly trust in truthfulness, or that may be trust
in relevance which typically implies truthfulness)
is an automatic part of the interpretation
process. In engaging in conversation, and
through this stance of trust, people develop a
“common ground” or a “mutual cognitive 
environment”.33 They do so at least tentatively in
the context, and for the sake of the verbal
exchange and of social intercourse more 
generally. This may ready them for a full-ﬂedged
acceptance of the contents of this common
ground, but this is not automatic. The stance of
trust involved in communication is both 
fundamental and fragile, and can easily be
withdrawn when it comes to accepting the 
content understood. Such an approach there-
fore meets the anti-reductionist requirement of
“non gullibility”: that is, the requirement that 
people should not automatically accept 
whatever their interlocutors say. 
In young children, the stance of trust needed
for comprehension may extend into quasi-
automatic acceptance. This may be a distinctive
trait of a phase of cognitive development where
language acquisition, language understanding
and the acquisition of information about the
world are wholly intertwined processes.34 Once,
however, children master to a sufﬁcient level the
language spoken in their community and have
reﬁned their interpretive abilities, they may 
display a somewhat more sceptical attitude
toward information that comes from others. This
doesn’t mean that they systematically start
checking the truth or the probability of what they
are told. Rather, what they become better at is
checking the intentions of their interlocutors and
the reasons they have to communicate with
them. Thus they may start developing more ﬁne
grained heuristics for assessing credibility and
trustworthiness.
A large part of our knowledge reaches us
through communication and communication is a
much more creative and richly interpretive
process than is usually acknowledged. We do
not just accept information, but we reconstruct in
a manner relevant for us. Trusting other people
is involved in the constructive process of under-
standing. There is no passive “blind trust”. There
is no blind trust in communication in the same
sense as there are no raw sense data in 
perception. A stance of trust, however, is part of
the interpretive competence that grounds our
capacities to understand, to learn how to 
communicate, and to cope with the complex
social networks of knowledge that make us
humans.*
E P I S T E M E J u n e  2 0 0 4 9
attenuated, I believe, by looking at the very
nature of communication, without which the
acquisition of vicarious knowledge would be
impossible. 
The pragmatics of trust
While epistemology has taken an interest in the
empirical study of cognition, and social 
epistemology in the empirical study of 
knowledge institutions, very little attention has
been paid to the empirical study of 
communication, even by those who, like Burge
or Coady, give a central place to the nature of
communication in their account of epistemic
trust. The transfer of testimonial information is
typically viewed as being achieved by means
of a linguistic encoding by the speaker of her
meaning and a decoding of that meaning by
her audience. In fact, hardly anybody involved
in the empirical study of comprehension accepts
this “code model” of linguistic communication.
Modern pragmatics, inspired by the work of the
philosopher Paul Grice,29 takes for granted that
comprehension is largely inferential. As argued
by Sperber and Wilson (1995), a 
linguistic utterance is best viewed not as an
encoding of the speaker’s meaning, but as a
semantically rich piece of evidence from which
this meaning can be inferred. The result of 
linguistic decoding is typically an ambiguous
and gappy conceptual structure that vastly
underdetermines its interpretation. Interpretation
is based on this decoded conceptual structure
taken together with contextual information and
guided by maxims of conversation (according to
Grice) or by expectations of relevance raised by
the utterance itself (according to Sperber &
Wilson).30
According to Grice, successful communication
involves cooperation among interlocutors. Their
conversation must have a common goal (or at
least a common direction), and their utterances
must be contributions to this common goal.
Interlocutors should conform to maxims of 
conversation that guide their cooperation.
Among these, there are maxims regarding 
truthfulness, and in particular the maxim “Do not
say what you believe to be false,” which Grice
viewed as the more important of all. A 
cooperative speaker will abide by the maxims
and, in particular, will speak truthfully.
Accepting such an account, one might view it
as going a long way towards grounding 
epistemic trust.31 There is an objection: people
can participate in conversation in bad faith, try
to deceive their audience, and pretend to be
cooperative when in fact they are not. Just as the
fact that the maker of an assertion presents her
assertion as true whether it is true or false and
therefore cannot very well be believed just
because she is making an assertion, a 
participant in a conversation cannot be
believed just because she presents herself as
cooperative and in particular as truthful. This
objection is reasonable but it does not make the
Gricean approach irrelevant to the study of trust.
Grice is not claiming that interlocutors are
always genuinely cooperative, and even less
that they always follow the maxims (since overt
violations of the maxims play a role in 
interpretation). What he is claiming is that the
audience must presuppose that the speaker is
cooperative and follows the maxims in order
properly to infer her meaning, even if, in the
process or later, they may be led to revise this
presupposition. So, adopting a stance of trust in
the cooperativeness and in particular in the truth-
fulness of the speaker is a constitutive part of the
comprehension process. This stance of trust is
adopted without any other reason than a desire
to engage in communication and understand
others. In this sense, it is a form of fundamental
trust.  However, this trust by default and for the
sake of comprehension can very easily be
rescinded when it comes not just to 
comprehending but to accepting the content
communicated, or even in the process of 
comprehension.
Wilson and Sperber (2002)32 have argued
that the presumption that guides comprehension
is not one of cooperativeness and truthfulness
but one of relevance. According to Relevance
Theory, every utterance conveys a presumption
of its own relevance, and this is what guides the
process of comprehension. More speciﬁcally,
hearers seek an interpretation that meets the
expectations of relevance raised by the 
utterance itself. That is, they adopt a stance of 
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